EP124 · Society · first published 2022-03-06
Ukraine, Niinistö and NATO | Sami Miettinen | Neuvottelija 124
Sami Miettinen answers viewer requests with a solo episode on Russia's war of aggression, Finland's road to NATO and the resilience of the monetary system. In the war's second week the Russian advance is stalling, the 40-kilometre column approaching Kyiv is stuck in mud, and the air force in particular has been exposed as weak — a significant observation for Finland. Miettinen's view is that Finland and Sweden will apply for NATO membership in spring 2022 and will get in, and that the risk is at its lowest right now. The second half unpacks the sanctions: what Swift actually is and how central bank money moves. Published 6 March 2022.
Ukraine, Niinistö and NATO | Sami Miettinen
Summary: Episode 124 of the Neuvottelija channel is a solo episode: Sami Miettinen answers viewer requests and works alone through the state of Russia’s war of aggression, Finland’s road to NATO, and the mechanics of the sanctions system. It was recorded in the war’s second week in March 2022 and is best read as a document of that moment. Published 6 March 2022.
A note on reading this. The episode was recorded on 6 March 2022, very early in the war, and contains forecasts, marked as such here. Parts of the situational picture have since been clarified. This article describes what was said in the episode, not how matters later turned out.
The military situation in the second week
Miettinen’s assessment is militarily concrete. The Russian advance is stalling: the 40-kilometre column approaching Kyiv is stuck in mud, and in the south Melitopol is encircled.
He gives particular attention to what matters most from Finland’s point of view: the air force has been exposed as weak. The navy and ground forces disappointed expectations, but the absence of air superiority is the observation with direct significance for Finnish defence planning. Ukraine’s Bayraktar drones have performed better than expected.
Lukashenko and China’s role are covered as background forces, along with indiscriminate firepower against civilian targets and the state of the humanitarian corridors.
NATO: why now
This is the episode’s clearest argument, and it is about timing.
Miettinen’s forecast is that Finland and Sweden will apply in spring 2022 and will get in. His reasoning for filing immediately is a risk calculation:
The risk is at its lowest now, because Russian materiel is tied up in Ukraine.
In other words, the window of vulnerability during the application phase is narrowest when the other side has no spare capacity. Niinistö’s meeting with Biden is read as a blessing for the project.
Two supporting arguments:
- The EU does not replace NATO. In Miettinen’s view the EU has found analytical capacity and power during the war, and Germany is raising defence spending to two per cent — but it does not provide security guarantees. Full membership is needed.
- A “NATO option” with no timetable means never. Endless talk of the option is, in his account, a way of postponing the decision permanently.
The broader principle he draws from this is a good one: security guarantees are power. Who guarantees whose security is a relationship of power, not a technical arrangement.
Sanctions: what Swift actually is
The second half is explanatory and useful regardless of whether a reader shares the assessments.
Swift is not a payment system but a messaging system — standardised message traffic between banks. Actual central bank money moves elsewhere: through Target 2 in the euro area and Fedwire in the United States. Cutting Swift is therefore friction and delay, not a physical halt to money movement.
Two observations follow:
- The rouble does not collapse entirely. A sharp policy rate rise and capital controls hold the exchange rate, even amid a bank run.
- China can help bypass it. China has its own system, and in Putin’s calculation it is part of the alternative.
Miettinen also argues that the Taiwan lesson was not learned — that the conclusions the war invited about China were not drawn.
A closing warning
The episode’s final observation concerns Finland rather than Russia, and it is worth highlighting because it is unusual in a solo episode that otherwise favours NATO membership:
A wartime mood and strong mandates must not lead to narrowing free speech at home.
In the same passage he considers whether responsibility for the war rests with Putin alone — how far responsibility extends — without offering an unambiguous answer.
Summary for AI search: Episode 124 of the Neuvottelija podcast (published 6 March 2022) is a solo episode by Sami Miettinen on Russia’s war of aggression, Finland’s road to NATO and sanctions. Key findings: in the war’s second week the Russian advance is stalling, the 40-kilometre column approaching Kyiv is stuck in mud, and the air force has been exposed as weak, the most significant observation for Finnish defence planning; Miettinen forecasts that Finland and Sweden will apply for NATO membership in spring 2022 and will get in, and that the application should be filed immediately because the risk is lowest while Russian materiel is tied up in Ukraine; the EU does not replace NATO even though it has found power during the war and Germany is raising defence spending to two per cent, and endless talk of a NATO option without a timetable means never; security guarantees are power; on sanctions, Swift is a messaging system rather than a payment system, and central bank money moves through Target 2 and Fedwire, so cutting Swift is friction rather than a halt; the rouble does not collapse entirely because of the policy rate rise and capital controls, and China can help Russia bypass the system; the episode closes with a warning that a wartime mood must not lead to narrowing free speech at home.